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DOES CRIME PAY-CAN PROBATION
STOP KATHERINE ANN POWER FROM
SELLING HER STORY?
I will not permit profit from the life blood of a Boston police officer
by someone responsible for his killing That is repugnant to me. . I
could not live with myself if I permitted it.'
On September 23, 1970, Katherine Ann Power sat in a parked car,
one-half mile from the State Street Bank in Brighton, Massachusetts. 2
This car was the "switch car" in the escape plan of Power and her
armed accomplices. 3 Three of Power's accomplices had just robbed the
State Street Bank. 4 Unknown to the robbers, a silent alarm in the bank
had already alerted the police,' Parked outside the bank was Power's
fourth accomplice, William Gilday.6 When Boston Police Officer Walter
Schroeder arrived at the scene with his partner, Gilday fired a subma-
chine gun at Officer Schroeder, fatally wounding him in the back.'
Thus began a twenty-three year flight from justice for Katherine
Ann Power.' Police caught three of her accomplices within five days.'
They caught the other in 1975. 10 But Power remained at large, the
target of the largest womanhunt in FBI history." In the early morning
on September 15, 1993, after months of secretive negotiations between
Power's attorneys and law enforcement officials, Power surrendered to
the Boston Police in the parking lot of Boston College Law School in
Newton, Massachusetts.' 2 Power pled guilty in Boston's Suffolk County
Statement by the trial court (Batiks, J.) before imposing sentence on Katherine Ann Power.
Record Appendix at 89, Power v. Commonwealth, SJC No. 06495, Mass. App. Ct. No. 93-P4755
(tiled Dec. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Appendix].
2 Id. at 20, 76.
5 Id. at 76,
4 Id. at 22.
6 See id. at 23.
6 Appendix, supra note 1, at 75.
7 Id at 24.
8 See Jacob Cohen, The Romance of Revolutionary Violence, NAT'L Rat'., Dec. 13, 1993, at 28.
Professor Cohen taught at Brandeis University while Power was a student, and for a number of
years has taught a course at Brandeis on "The Sixties." Id. at 29.
9 Appendix, supra note 1, at 24-25.
i° Id. at 25.
11 Margaret Carlson, The Return of the Fugitive, TIME, Sept. 27, 1993, at 60.
12 See Carlson, supra note 11, at 62; Charles Kranthammer, From People Power to Polenta,
Oct. 4, 1993, at 94.
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Superior Court to charges of armed robbery and manslaughter.' 3 The
trial court sentenced Power to eight to twelve years in prison, and in
an extraordinary step, a concurrent twenty-year probation term.' 4 As a
special condition of Power's probation, the court enjoined Power from
profiting or benefiting from her crimes.' 5 Violation of this condition
could result in life imprisonment for Power. 16
Probation conditions like the one imposed on Power must be
reasonably related to the purposes of probation." Every state, as well
as the federal court system, has its own law of probation. 18 In Massa-
chusetts, the purposes of probation are rehabilitation of the proba-
tioner and protection of the public against the probationer's recidi-
vism.'9 Probation conditions that restrict a probationer's constitutionally
guaranteed rights are subject to a more careful standard of review than
the mere "reasonable relationship" standard. 2° Massachusetts proba-
tion conditions that restrict a probationer's fundamental rights must
be necessary to the purposes of probation. 2 '
This Note examines the constitutionality of the probation condi-
tion that restricts Katherine Ann Power's freedom of expression as
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Section I discusses the facts surrounding Katherine Ann Power's crime
1 ; Appendix, supra note 1, at 7, 10-13. Power also pled guilty to federal charges that she and
her four accomplices broke into a National Guard armory in Newburyport, Massachusetts, on
September 20, 1970, and stole a pickup truck, blasting caps, and 400 rounds of .30-caliber
ammunition. Christopher B. Daly, Radical Fugitive Gets Fine But No More Prison Time, WASH.
POST, Nov. 25, 1993, at A3. On November 24, 1993, United States District Court Judge Nathaniel
Gorton sentenced Power to a live-year prison term, to run concurrently with her state prison
term, as well as a $10,000 fine. IS Power requested that the judge reduce her sentence and
recommend that she serve her time in a federal prison closer to her home in Oregon. See Judy
Rakowsky, Power Asks Judge to Reduce Sentence, BOSTON GLOSS, Feb. 12, 1994, at 59. judge Gorton
explained that he would not make such a recommendation unless Power demonstrated her
remorse by sharing with the Schroeder family the profits from selling her story. Id. At her
sentencing in federal court, Power said, "Ulf at any time I should be able to accrue a financial
reward or compensation for my story, I will do something to benefit the Schroeder family." Id.
Power's attorney, however, later filed a letter with Judge Gorton stating that she did not believe
Power could provide such a benefit to the Schroeder family until the state probation condition
was overturned. Brief for Appellant at Ex. B, Power v. Commonwealth, SIC No. 06495, Mass. App.
Ct. No. 95-P-1755 (filed Dec. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
14 Id at 3.
15 Appendix, supra note 1, at 88-89.
16 1d. at 89.
17 See infra notes 162-90 and accompanying text.
18 See ANDREW R. KLEIN, DEFENDING PROBATION REVOCATIONS (90-662) 7 (MCLE 1989);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 941-42 (Student ed. 1985).
19 See infra notes 129-61 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text
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and flight from justice. 22
 Section II examines probation and its goals,
focusing primarily on probation under Massachusetts law. 23 Section III
addresses the standard of review for probation conditions, both in
Massachusetts and in other jurisdictions." Finally, Section IV analyzes
the constitutionality of Katherine Ann Power's probation condition,
concluding that it impermissibly restricts her freedom of expression
because the condition is not necessary to accomplish an acceptable
purpose of probation in Massachusetts. 25
I. KATHERINE ANN POWER: RADICAL, FELON, FUGITIVE, AND
PRISONER
Katherine Ann Power enrolled at Brandeis University in Waltham,
Massachusetts, in 1967. 26
 Like many college campuses in the late 1960s,
Brandeis had a contingent of radical protesters in its student body.27
Power first became involved with this group in 1968, when the group
seized a seldom-used building on campus and declared it a "sanctuary"
in which they would harbor a soldier who had deserted in protest of
the Vietnam War. 28
 The group turned the building into a commune,
which was to be a prefigurement of the uninhibited world to come. 29
In 1969, Power was part of a group of Brandeis students who declared
a national student strike, demanding the immediate release of all
imprisoned Black Panthers and an immediate withdrawal from Viet-
22 See infra notes 26-100 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 101-61 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 162-282 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 283-332 and accompanying text.
26 See Cohen, ,supra note 8, at 29. Two of Power's accomplices in the fatal hank robbery were
also students at Brandeis. hi at 28. One was her roommate, Susan Saxe. Carlson, supra note II,
at 61. The other was Stanley Bond, who allegedly masterminded the hank robbery. Cohen, supra
note 8, at 33. Bond was an ex-convict who enrolled in an inmate-education program at Brandeis.
Carlson, supra note 11, at 61. Richard Onorato, dean of students at the time, protested to the
dean of faculty against Bond's admission because he thought Bond was "borderline psychotic."
hi
27 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 29.
28 Id. The "deserter" to whom the group offered sanctuary turned out to be an impostor, not
a deserter at all. Id. at 30.
28 Id. at 29. The "Sanctuarists," as Professor Cohen describes them, numbered approximately
300 students. Id. With drugs and guitars in band, they were exhilarated by their undertaking
and undaunted by the prospect of defending their "deserter" against the United States Army's
expected attempt to reclaim him. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 29. Professor Cohen notes that the
group tore down the signs over the men's and women's rooms, and the bathroom stall partitions,
because there would be no "self-withholding, bourgeois notions of privacy" in the world to come.
Id. The group debated for two days whether they should make decisions by unanimous or majority
vote. Id. They finally decided, although not unanimously, to have a vote on whether to have votes.
Id. at 29-30. This vote turned out to be inconclusive. Id. at 30.
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nam." Power also participated in the "Brandeis University Strike Infor-
mation Center" that helped organize and report student protests across
the nation.s'
Many in the media have characterized Power's actions as a protest
against the war in Vietnam.s2 But this explanation is illogical and
ignores the facts." The bank robbery was only the first step of their
plan)' The group hoped to use the stolen cash to buy explosives
capable of disabling trains that carried weapons; with these weapons
they would arm the Black Panthers."
Two of Power's accomplices were also Brandeis students: Stanley
Bond, the alleged mastermind of the bank robbery, and Susan Saxe,
Power's college roommate. 36 In addition, the group recruited two ex-
convicts to assist in the robbery, William "Lefty" Gilday and Robert
Valeri. 37 On September 23, 1970, Power sat behind the wheel of the
"switch car" parked one-half mile from the State Street Bank." Gilday
parked across the street from the bank as a lookout. 39 As Bond, Valeri
and Saxe left the bank, a silent alarm sounded." Boston Police Officer
Walter Schroeder and his partner responded. 4 ' When Officer Schroeder
approached the front door of the bank, Gilday shot him in the back
with a submachine gun, fatally wounding him. 42 Although Gilday pulled
the trigger, all the participants in a felony that takes a victim's life may
be charged with murder. 43
Police caught three of Power's accomplices within five days of
the robbery." Valeri, who received a twenty-five year prison sentence
and has since been released, provided evidence that helped convict
Gilday." Gilday received a life sentence for murder." Bond died in
3" Cohen, supra note 8, at 32.
31 See id.
" Id. at 28.
"See id. As Professor Cohen asks, what is the symbolic logic of a mere bank robbery which,
if successful, would only be reported as a bank robbery? Id.
34 See Carlson, supra note 11, at 61.
36 See id; Cohen, supra note 8, at 28.
37 Appendix, .supra note 1, at 21; Carlson, supra note 11, at 61.
38 Appendix, supra note 1, at 74, 76.
39 hi. at 20.
4" See id. at 22-23.
41 Id. at 23.
42 Id. at 24.
43 See Cornmonwcalih v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Mass. 1990) (felony-murder rule imposes
criminal liability for homicide on all participants in a felony that results in death).
44 Appendix, supra note 1, at 24-25.
45 See Katherine Ann Power, WASH. TimEs, Oct. 12, 1993, at A16.
46 Carlson, supra note 11, at 62.
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1972 in prison while awaiting tria1. 47 He was making a bomb to blast
his way out of prison when the bomb exploded and killed him." Power
and Saxe went underground after the robbery, tapping radical and
feminist contacts to stay ahead of the authorities.'" Saxe was captured
in 1975 in Philadelphia.° After serving five years in prison, she now
works for a charitable organization in Philadelphia. 5 '
The authorities were never able to catch Power. 52 She became the
object of the largest womanhunt in FBI history, keeping her on the
FBI's ten-most-wanted list for fourteen years. 55 In 1984, the FBI dropped
her from the list for a lack of leads. 54 Power spent nine years living in
women's communes, and then moved to Oregon's Williamette Valley
with her infant son, whose biological father Power has never narned.55
Power took the name Alice Metzinger from the birth certificate of an
infant who died in the year Power was born. 56 She became involved
with a local meatcutter and bookkeeper, Rodney Duncan, whom she
lived with and later married." She established herself as a valued
consultant to the area's gourmet restaurants." Power opened a restau-
rant in Eugene, Oregon, and became active in the community, teach-
ing nutrition classes at the local college. 56
Unlike Katherine Ann Power, the family of Officer Walter Schroeder
had no escape from the tragic aftermath of the fatal robbery.° Officer
Schroeder's murder left a void in the lives of his wife and nine chil-
dren.6 ' His oldest daughter, Clare, in her victim impact statement at
Power's sentencing, said:.
While Katherine Ann Power was fleeing across the country
spending the money that she stole from the State Street Bank,
smuggling sawed-off shot guns through the St. Louis airport




	 Katherine Ann Power, supra note 45, 0 A16.
50 Carlson, ,supra note 11, at 62.
5/ Id.
52 See id. at 60.
55 Id.
54 See
55 Carlson, supra note 11, at 61.
55 /d.
57 Id. at 61-62.
58 /d. at 61.
59 See 20/20: The Fugitive (ABC television broadcast, trans. no. 1406-1, Feb. 11, 1994).
See Appendix, supra note 1, at 54-57.
51 See id.
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military shipments, my mother was burying my father in
Evergreen Cemetery in Brighton.
While Katherine Power was establishing her new life in
Oregon, learning to cook and establishing a restaurant and
hunting game birds with her husband, my mother was strug-
gling every day to care for us, provide for us and give us a
loving home. . . . She did all of this without the help of a
husband. And she did this on a police pension from the
Boston police department. 62
Clare Schroeder recalled being called to the principal's office in
school where her uncle informed her that her father had been shot.°
Later, she had to tell her brothers and sisters that their father was
dead.'"4 She said, "I remember walking from house to house, where my
brothers and sisters were staying with relatives. I told each of my
brothers and sisters that my father had died. Each time ... I cried all
over again. . . . "65 Four of Officer Schroeder's children became police
officers, his daughters Clare and Erin, and his sons Paul and Edward. 66
Clare said they became police officers because of their father, to "follow
in [his] tradition of service and devotion." 67 Officer Walter Schroeder
was a local hero who single-handedly caught a gang of armed bank
robbers in 1968, at the very bank where he would later meet his
death.''s
While the Schroeder family mourned their loss, Katherine Ann
Power spent years hiding her secret life from those around her. 69 The
strain of life as a fugitive from justice eventually proved too much for
her. 7° Power could not sleep and thought of suicide!' A therapist
thought there was something more than depression, and eventually
Power revealed her secret."
62 Id. at 54-55.
65 1d. at 50-51.
ki at 52.
65 Appendix, supra note 1, at 52.
66 1d at 49.
67 hi.
6g hi at 48.
69 See Carlson, supra note 11, at 60.
7° See id. at 60-61. In 1992, Power attended a night class on depression at Oregon's Albany
General Hospital. Id. at 61. At one point, Power attempted to ask a question, but began to sob
so violently that she could not speak the words. Id. Therapist Linda Caroll said of Power, "I've
never seen anybody in such psychic pain.... She was pure depression." hi
71 Carlson, supra note 11, at 61.
72 1d.
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Therapist Linda Caroll sent Power to a psychiatrist for the antide-
pressant medication Trazodone, to treat a chemical imbalance from
which Power suffered." The therapist also put Power in touch with
Oregon lawyer Steven Black, who later contacted Boston lawyer Rikki
Klieman. 74 Power felt compelled to surrender, in order to live truthfully
with herself and her loved ones." Black and Klieman negotiated with
the authorities over a period of fourteen months." During this time
Power gradually revealed her secret to her loved ones and friends."
On September 15, 1993, Power surrendered to Boston Police."
Later that day, Power pied guilty in Boston's Suffolk County Supe-
rior Court to two counts of armed robbery and one count of man-
slaughter, which had been reduced from murder." On October 6,
1993, the trial court sentenced Power to eight to twelve years in prison,
pursuant to the recommendation of the assistant district attorney, as
outlined in Power's plea agreement.8° The court also placed Power on
probation for twenty years, with the probation and prison terms run-
ning concurrently.'" Although the text of the Massachusetts probation
statute does not expressly prohibit such a combination, it is extremely
unusual and is inconsistent with the traditional concept of probation
in Massachusetts. 82 As a special condition of Power's probation, the
court prohibited Power "from directly or indirectly engaging in any
activity related to the profit or benefit generated as a result of criminal
acts" for which she was convicted.83 Violation of this condition could
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 20/20: The Fugitive, supra note 59.
79 Carlson, supra note 11, at 62. During the negotiations, Klicman kept her contact with both
Black and Power extremely limited. Dimitra Kessenides, Bringing in a Sixties Fugitive, Am.
Nov. 1993, at 33. She did not meet Power in person until two nights before her surrender, and
she met Black in person only once. Id. She even started placing phone calls to Black via pay
phones, to avoid creating a trail to Black and Power. Id Said Klieman, I didn't want to know
where [Power] was.... I would be compromised in doing her negotiations." Id.
77 Carlson, supra note I1, at 62.
78	Krauthammer, supra note 12, at 94.
79 Appendix, supra note 1, at 10-13.
8° Id. at 38,88,90-91.
8 t Id. at 88.
83 See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
83 Apperniix, supra note 1, at 92. The text of the special condition, as interpreted by the
Department of Probation, reads as follows:
You, your assignees and your representatives acting on your authority arc prohibited
from directly or indirectly engaging in any profit or benefit generating activity
relating to the publication of facts or circumstances pertaining to your involvement
in the criminal acts for which you stand convicted (including contracting with any
person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity with respect
to the commission and/or reenactment of your crimes, by way of a movie, book,
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subject Power to life imprisonment." The probation condition ex-
ceeded the plea agreement that Power's attorneys had negotiated with
the District Attorney's Office. 85
Power has publicly stated that she feels remorse for her crime.86
At her sentencing in state court Power said, "1 cannot possibly say in
words how sorry I am for the death of Officer Schroeder. My whole
adult life has been a continuing act of contrition. . . . I am here today
because I recognize that I also have a debt to my society. . 
. "87 In a
letter to the court before her sentencing, Power wrote, "[t]hat I never
meant for it to happen cannot excuse the reality that my wrong-head-
magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television presenta-
tions, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of your thoughts,
feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime), This prohibition includes
those events undertaken and experienced by you while avoiding apprehension from
the authorities. Any action taken by you whether by way of execution of power of
attorney, creation of corporate entities or like action to avoid compliance with this
condition of probation will be considered a violation of probation conditions.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at Ex. A.
84 Appendix, supra note 1, at 89,
kL at 88, 90. The trial court told Power on September 15, 1993, that, if the court accepted
her guilty plea and exceeded the district attorney's recommendation, she would have an oppor-
tunity to withdraw her plea. Id. at 30; see MASS. CRIM. R. 12(c)(6) (if judge decides to exceed
sentencing recommendation in plea agreement, judge shall advise defendant that judge intends
to exceed recommendation and shall afford defendant opportunity to withdraw guilty plea), Just
before sentencing, the trial court announced that it was exceeding the district attorney's recom-
mendation, and imposed the special condition of probation. Appendix, supra note 1, at 90. The
court then asked whether Power wished to accept the sentence or withdraw her plea. Id. Power
accepted the sentence, and the court notified her that she had ten days in which to file an appeal
of her sentence. Id. at 90-91.
Arguahly, Power's acceptance of her sentence might constitute consent to the probation
conditions under either the "act of grace" or "contract" theories of probation. See Cathryn Jo
Rosen, The Fourth Amendment Implications of Urine 'listing for Evidence of Drug Use in Probation,
55 BROOK. L. REV. 1159, 1164 (1990). The "act of grace" theory of probation reasons that, by
accepting the state's "act of grace," the offer of probation in lieu of prison, the probationer
impliedly consents to abide by the conditions. See id. The United States Supreme Court rejected
this theory, stating that courts may not rely on the "act of grace" theory to deny probationers
due process. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973); Rosen, supra, at 1194. The
"contract" theory of probation views the decision to grant probation as an offer of freedom from
imprisonment, in consideration of which the probationer agrees to obey the conditions. See
Rosen, supra, at 1194. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has rejected the notion that
accepting probation constitutes a binding contract. Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379,
381 n.3 (Mass. 1988) ("[T] he Commonwealth properly does not argue that the petitioner assented
to any unconstitutional condition of her probation. The coercive quality of the circumstance in
which a defendant seeks to avoid incarceration by obtaining probation on certain conditions
makes principles of voluntary waiver and consent generally inapplicable."). Accordingly, Power's
acceptance of her sentence does not constitute consent. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 n.4; LaFrance,
525 N.E.2d at 381 n.3; Rosen, supra, at 1194.
86
 See Appendix, supra note 1, at 83.
87
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edness, my naiveté and my willingness to break the law resulted in the
death of another person.... To say that I am sorry for his death seems
so utterly, utterly inadequate. Daily I confront the damage I have done
not only to his life but to the lives of his family and friends." 88
Despite her expression of guilt and remorse, the trial court for-
bade her from selling the story of her crime or of her years as a
fugitive." 'True crime" stories such as Power's are today's hottest sell-
ing televisions shows, movies and books." In one week, Charles Man-
son and Jeffrey Dahmer appeared on prime time television to talk
about their crimes.'" Convicted serial killers' paintings sell for hun-
dreds of dollars each, and appear in exhibits such as 'The Death Row
Art Show."" Amy Fisher and Joey Buttafuoco have profited from the
publicity surrounding their crimes." Media watchers speculate that the
arrest of CIA official Aldrich Ames and his wife, accused of spying for
the KGB, will lead to a made-for-TV movie. 94
 Even John and Lorena
Bobbitt, although acquitted of criminal charges, are profiting from the
publicity surrounding their cases." Although the thought of the cast
of characters mentioned above making money by talking about their
crimes is repugnant, it is a fact of life in today's mass communications
"marketplace of ideas."96
Clare Schroeder summed up the social discontent with the ineq-
uity of criminals reaping profits from the publicity that their crimes
generated. 97
 At Power's sentencing, Schroeder said to the court, "we
are deeply disturbed that Katherine Power has become a celebrity and
that the entertainment industry is clamoring for the rights to her story.
The prospect that Miss Power may make a small fortune from selling
the story of my father's murder is absolutely obscene."98
 The trial court
sought to eliminate this possibility by imposing the probation condi-
tion that prohibits Power from profiting by selling her story." Power
88 Patricia Nealon, Power Given 8 to 12 Years and Warning, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7,1993, at
1, 26.
89
 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at Ex. B.; Appendix, supra note 1, at 92.
9° See Brief for Criminal justice Institute as Amieus Curiae at 5-6, Power v. Commonwealth,
SIC No. 06495, Mass. App. Ct. No. 93-P-1755, (filed Mar. 15, 1994) [hereinafter CfrArnicus Brief],
91 Id. at 5.
92 Id. at 6.
1)3 a
94 Id.
95 Cji Amicus Brief, supra note 90, at 7.
96 See id. at 9,
97 See Appendix., supra note 1, at 62-63.
88 Id.
" See id, at 88-89.
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has appealed this special condition of probation to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts.'" The balance of this Note explores the
propriety of using probation as a vehicle to prevent Katherine Ann
Power from selling her story.
II. PROBATION AND ITS GOALS
A. Probation in Massachusetts
Probation is generally considered an alternative to incarceration,
wherein a court releases a defendant pursuant to certain conditions.'°'
Many state and federal probation statutes enumerate standard condi-
tions that apply to all probationers)" Massachusetts' probation statute
requires a mandatory probation fee of all supervised probationers, and
the Massachusetts Superior Court Rules establish several standard con-
ditions.'" A Massachusetts judge may also impose "special conditions"
of probation, tailored to meet the circumstances of each probationer.'"
Many probation statutes list special conditions from which judges may
choose, and grant the judge discretion to fashion other appropriate
special conditions.'" Massachusetts' probation statute grants the judge
discretion to fashion appropriate special conditions, and a few offense-
specific conditions are scattered throughout the Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws.'"
100 Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at 1. On appeal, Power asks the court to vacate the
condition because: (1) the condition is unconstitutionally vague; (2) the condition places Power's
freedom in jeopardy from the actions of third parties; (3) the condition is an unconstitutional
prior restraint on expression; (4) the condition is an unconstitutional content-based restriction
on speech; and (5) the trial court cannot condition acceptance of Power's plea on a waiver of
First Amendment rights. See id at 2. This Note examines only whether a content-based restriction
of speech is a valid probation condition in Massachusetts.
101 See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 100,112 (2d ed. 1991); LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 18, at 943.
102 See KLEiN, supra note 18, at 7.
II/3 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 276, § 87A (1992) (all probationers on supervised probation must pay
fee unless it would constitute undue hardship); MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 56 (defendant shall comply
with court orders, report to probation officer as required, notify probation officer of change in
address, make reasonable efforts to obtain and keep employment, make reasonable efforts to
provide support for dependents, and not violate any law, statute, ordinance or regulation).
104 See MASS, DEPT. tit:TRIAL Cr., Comm. ON STANDARDS, Standards for Sentencing and Other
Dispositions 4:03 & cmt. (1984) (hereinafter Standards].
11I5 LAFAVF, & ISRAEL, supra note 18, at 942.
MG Statutes authorizing judicial discretion to fashion special conditions: MASS. GEN. L. ch.
276, § 87 (1992) (court may order such probation conditions as it deems proper); Mass. GEN.
L. ch. 276, § 87A (1992) (Court may order specified rehabilitative programs or community service
work); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 280, § 6 (1992) (court may impose costs as condition of probation).
Statutes authorizing offense-specific conditions: MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111E, § 12 (1992) (court may
order treatment in inpatient or outpatient facility and optional periodic drug tests for drug
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A probation term, like a term of imprisonment, is a criminal
sentence.'" Massachusetts sentencing judges may combine probation
with imprisonment in several ways.'°8 First, and perhaps most familiar,
is "straight probation."mg After a guilty finding, the judge imposes a
sentence of probation, without a prison term."'" Second, probation may
be combined with a suspended sentence."' The judge may order a
sentence of imprisonment, but suspend part or all of the prison sen-
tence."' When a judge suspends part or all of a prison sentence, the
judge must also place the defendant on probation. 115 Suspension of
part of the prison sentence, resulting in imprisonment followed by
probation, is called a "split sentence."" 4 Third, the judge may order
"pretrial probation" for a person charged with a crime before the
court."5 This enables the judge to place some restrictions on a person
who has been charged with a crime but has not been found guilty." 6
"Pretrial probation" is suited to cases of domestic violence and emer-
gency situations.'"
Arguably, the text of the probation statute also permits concurrent
terms of imprisonment and probation."8 Although the idea of a prison
inmate reporting periodically to meet with a probation officer may
seem illogical, the text of the Massachusetts probation statute does not
explicitly prohibit concurrent terms of imprisonment and probation
like that imposed on Katherine Ann Power."'" However, no precedent
exists in Massachusetts for concurrent sentences of imprisonment and
probation. 12° The Massachusetts Standards for Sentencing and Other
abusers); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 119, § 58 (1992) (court may require juveniles to "do work or
participate in activities ... deemed appropriate by the court"); Mass. GEN. L. ch. 119, § 62 (1992)
(court may order juveniles to pay restitution if they committed acts involving civil liability).
"17 See McHoul v. Commonwealth, 312 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Mass, 1974); Standards, supra note
104, at 4:00 cmt.
1 a8 See Standards, supra note 104, at 4:01, 4:02, 6:00 & cmt.
I" See id. at 4:02 & cmt.
1 m See id.
See id. at 6:00 & cmt.
112 See id,
113 See Standards, supra note 104, at 6:00 & cmt,
114
 KLEIN, supra note 18, at 2.
115 See Standards, supra note 104, at 4:01 & cmt.
116 See id. at 4:01 & cmt.
" 7 See id
"8 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 276 § 87 ("court ... may place on probation ... any person before
it charged with an offense . . . for such time and upon such conditions as it deems proper ..
in any case after a finding or verdict of guilty").
119 See id.
12" Neither the research	 this Note, nor the research of the Criminal Justice Institute as
Amicus Curiae in Power v. Commonwealth, revealed any precedent for concurrent sentences of
imprisonment and probation, CflArnicus Brief, supra note 90, at 31. The Supreme Judicial Court
recently defined probation as "a legal disposition which allows a criminal offender to remain in
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Dispositions do not contemplate such concurrent sentences. 12 ' Concur-
rent terms of probation and imprisonment are fundamentally incon-
sistent with the common law roots of probation in Massachusetts. 122
Katherine Ann Power's sentence, eight to twelve years in prison plus a
concurrent twenty-year probation term, would be impermissible under
federal law and the Model Penal Code.'"
If a defendant violates any probation condition during the proba-
tion term, the probation officer may "surrender" the defendant to the
court on the probation violation.'" To "surrender" means to bring the
probationer back before the court and to charge the probationer with
the probation violation.i 2" The probationer is then entitled to a proba-
the community subject to certain conditions and under the supervision of the court." Common-
wealth v, Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (Mass. 1990). This definition weighs strongly against
the validity of concurrent sentences of probation and imprisonment. See id, Furthermore, a joint
report by the Boston Bar Association and the Crime and Justice Foundation states that judges
must choose between imposing sentences of incarceration or probation. See BosroN BAR ASSO-
CIATION & CRIME & JUSTICE FOUNDATION, TASK FORCE ON JUSTICE, THE CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS
AND SENTENCING IN MASSACHUSETTS 12 (1991). One authoritative text explicitly defines proba-
tion as "a sentence not involving confinement...." LAFAVE & ISRAEL, SUpTa note 18, at 941,
121
 See Standards, supra note 104, at 4:00—:04 & cmt. In a manual on defending probation
revocations, the Chief Probation Officer of the Quincy Division of the Massachusetts Trial Court
did not mention concurrent terms as one of the possible sentencing combinations. See KLEIN,
supra DOW 18, at 2. According to the manual, possible probation-prison combinations include:
straight probation (e.g., defendant found guilty, sentenced to probation term only); suspended
sentences (e.g., defendant found guilty, one year prison term, suspended pending completion of
probation term); split sentences (e.g., defendant found guilty, one year prison term, six months
committed, six months suspended pending completion of probation term); and cases continued
without a finding but with probation term imposed. a
122
 Probation began in the 1800s as a procedure whereby courts suspended criminals' prison
sentences for a short time. See CHARLES CHUTE. & MARJORIE BELL, CRIME, COURTS AND PROBA-
TION 38 (1956). At the end of the suspension, if a criminal had maintained good behavior, the
court would merely impose a small fine in lieu of the prison term. See hi Probation thus arose
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as an alternative to imprisonment. See hi; Bruce D.
Greenberg, Note, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When Reasonableness is Not
Enough, 17 Cott/m..11. & SOC. PROBS. 45, 48-49 (1981).
1" See 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a) (3) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (court may order probation unless
defendant is at same time sentenced to term of imprisonment); MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.02(d)
(1985) (court may not sentence defendant to simultaneous terms of probation and imprison-
ment). A federal judge may impose a special probation condition that the probationer remain
in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons during nights and weekends or reside at a community
corrections facility. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b) (I 1), (12) (1988). The Model Penal Code permits "shock
probation," wherein the judge may impose an initial term of up to 30 days in prison as a special
probation condition. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.02(3) (b), (d). The purpose of "shock probation"
is to stun the probationer with the harsh realities of imprisonment, then release the probationer
into society with a strong impression of the consequences of crime. See CAMPBELL, supra note
101, at 104.
124 Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (Mass. 1990).
125 Id.
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tion revocation hearing.' 26
 Upon finding a violation of a probation
term that was part of a suspended sentence, the judge must vacate the
suspension and order the execution of the previously suspended sen-
tence.'" In contrast, finding a "straight probation" violation allows a
court to impose any sentence appropriate to the offense for which
probation was originally imposed.' 28
B. The Goals of Massachusetts Probation
Although some probation statutes identify the specific goals of
probation, Massachusetts' probation statute does not. 129
 The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court, however, recently recognized the dual
goals of probation: rehabilitation of the probationer and protection of
the public.'" These two goals ultimately amount to the same thing:
prevention of recidivism.' 5 ' Rehabilitation of the probationer prevents
future criminal behavior through measures that eliminate or substan-
tially reduce the probationer's criminal propensities.'" By reducing the
probationer's criminal propensities, probation reduces the risk that the
probationer poses to the public.'" This concept of preventing recidi-
vism is also called "specific" or "special" deterrence.'"
Specific deterrence is an effort to prevent offenders from repeat-
ing the same or other criminal acts.'" Courts may accomplish specific
deterrence both by imprisonment and by. probation.'" Imprisonment
126 Id. A probation revocation hearing is not part of a criminal prosecution, and therefore a
probationer is not entitled to all the constitutional protections applicable to a criminal trial. M.
(citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)). Because revocation hearings deprive
probationers of liberty within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, probationers are entitled to some protection. Id. at 1195-96. The
minimum due process requirements include: written notice of the claimed violations; disclosure
of the evidence against the probationer; the opportunity to he heard in person, and to present
witnesses and evidence; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; a neutral
hearing body, which need not be lawyers or judicial officers; and a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revocation. Id. at 1196.
127
 See Standards, supra note 104, at 6:00 & cmt.
L28 See id.
129 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 276, § 87 (1992).
t"Cotnmonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2c1 379, 381, 383 (Mass. 1988).
" I See James C. Weissman, Constitutional Printer on Modern Probation Conditions, 8 /siva,. ENG.
J. Pius. L. 367, 373-74 (1982).
132
 CAMPBELI., supra note 101, at 29.
188 See Weissman, supra note 131, at 373-74.
134 See United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2cl 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1985); CAMPBELL, =pre/ mite
101, at 25.
1 " See CAMPBELL, supra note 101, at 25.
"6 See id.
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makes it impossible for the offender to perpetrate another crime upon
society, at least during the prison term. 137 Probation changes the pro-
bationer's behavior such that, assuming the probationer obeys the
conditions, he or she will not perpetrate another crime upon society.'"
The concept of "general deterrence" is related to, but different
from, specific deterrence.'" Both general and specific deterrence seek
to prevent crime.'" General deterrence prevents the public at large
from wrongdoing by punishing one offender, thereby intimidating the
general public with the fear of punishment."' Specific deterrence, on
the other hand, deters future wrongdoing by an individual offender
by rehabilitating or incapacitating the offender.'"
The common law development of probation in Massachusetts
illustrates the distinction between general and specific deterrence.'"
Probation, as it began in Massachusetts, focused on improving the
probationer's circumstances and preventing further crimes against so-
ciety by the probationer. 194 If a court wanted to deter the general public
from committing crimes, it would make an example of the offender
by sending him or her to prison.'" Instead, the court allows as the
probationer a chance to rehabilitate himself or herself, yet maintains
supervision over the probationer to protect the public from the pro-
bationer's potential recidivism.'" The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court has repeatedly affirmed that the focus is on rehabilitating the
probationer and protecting the community from his or her recidivism,
137 See id at 18.
158 See id. at 18, 25.
139 See id at 25.
14° See CAMPBELL, supra note 101, at 18, 25.
141 See id.
142 See id
'43A Boston cobbler and philanthropist named John Augustus is commonly known as the
"father of probation." NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. CrOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
7 (1983). In 1841, Augustus began voluntarily providing bail for offenders in the local courts to
obtain postponement of their sentences, conditioned upon their good behavior. See CHUTE &
Bali., supra note 122, at 38; Greenberg, supra note 122, at 48-49. Augustus helped the offenders
obtain employment, cope with family problems, find homes, and deal with other practical matters.
See CHUTE & BELL, supra note 122, at 38. At the end of the postponement he brought the
offenders back to court where, if there were no further complaints against them, the judge
imposed a nominal fine. Id. Augustus called this process "bail[ing] out on probation." Id.
144 See supra note 143.
145 See CAMPBELL, supra note 101, at 18, 25.
146 .See CHUTE & BELL, supra note 122, at 38; Greenberg, supra note 122, at 49.
September 1994]	 KATHERINE ANN POWER	 1217
and not on generally deterring the public. 147 General deterrence is
therefore not a valid goal of probation in Massachusetts.'"
Several federal courts, in defining the legitimate goals of proba-
tion, have distinguished general deterrence from the concepts of re-
habilitation and protection of the public.' 49 In 1985, in United States v.
Abushaar, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that a probation condition that served only the purpose of general
deterrence was invalid. 154 An alien, who made false statements to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding his involvement in
147 See Commonwealth v. Olsen, 541 N.E.2d 1003, 1004-05 (Mass, 1989) ("Probation is
granted with the hope that the probationer will be able to rehabilitate himself or herself under
the supervision of the probation officer."); Commonwealth v. Vincente, 540 N.E.2d 669, 671
(Mass. 1989) ("Evidence that a probationer is not complying with the conditions of probation
may indicate that he or she has not been rehabilitated and continues to pose a threat to the
public."); King 14 Commonwealth, 140 N.E. 253, 254 (Mass. 1923) ("judge ... places the defen-
dant on probation upon certain terms and conditions, provided such disposition can be made
with due regard to the protection of the community, and the past history and present disposition
of the person ... indicate that he may reasonably be expected to reform without punishment").
148 See Olsen, 541 N.E.2d at 1004-05; Vincente, 540 N.E.2d at 670; King, 140 N.E. at 254; see
also CAMPBELL, supra note 101, at 18, 25; CHUTE & BELL, supra note 122, at 38; Greenberg, supra
note 122, at 40; Weissman, supra note 131, at 373-74.
119 See United States v. Tolls, 781 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (message to public not a proper
justification fbr probation condition); United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1985)
(invalidating condition that only served general deterrence because not reasonably related to
rehabilitation and protecting public). But see United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir.
1979) (conditions mustbe reasonably related to "rehabilitation of the probationer, protection of
the public against other offenses during its term, deterrence of future misconduct by the proba-
tioner or general deterrence of others, condign punishment, or some combination of these
objectives"); United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir,) (upholding probation condition
of community service as reasonably related to rehabilitation and protecting public, noting that
condition served, in part, as deterrent to other potential offenders), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992
(1979).
Recent amendments to federal sentencing laws confuse the issue. Federal law now distin-
guishes between probation, in which there is no prison term imposed, and "supervised release,"
in which a period of probation follows a prison term. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b), 3583(d) (1988 &
Supp. 1992). Both may "afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct" and "protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant" 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B) & (C), 3563(b),
3583(d) (1). One may interpret "deterrence to criminal conduct" to mean general deterrence,
because reading it to mean specific deterrence would make the two phrases redundant. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Straight probation conditions may "reflect the seriousness of the offense,"
"promote respect for the law," and "provide just punishment for the offense." See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a) (2) (A), 3563(b). Supervised release conditions, however, may not serve these goals.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(d)(1). The reason for this distinction may be that the prison term
satisfies the sentencing purposes or punishment and general deterrence, thus obviating the need
to consider those factors in conditions of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) (2), 3563(b),
3583 (d) (1 ).
15°761 F.2(.1 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1985).
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a scheme to fraudulently obtain permanent residence status, appealed
a probation condition requiring him to stay out of the United States
during his probation."' The Third Circuit noted that the government's
sole reason for the condition was general deterrence: to deter others
from committing similar offenses. 152 The court stated that probation
conditions that deter others by way of example are not necessarily
invalid, but to survive they must serve substantially the purposes of
probation: rehabilitation and protection of the public.' 53 Because the
sole purpose of the condition was general deterrence, the court invali-
dated it as unrelated to the goals of probation.'" Explicit in the court's
reasoning is the conclusion that general deterrence is a concept wholly
distinct from rehabilitation and protection of the public.' 55
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit simi-
larly distinguished general deterrence from rehabilitation and protec-
tion of the public in 1986, in United States v. To/1a.' 56 The court reviewed
probation conditions prohibiting a teacher, convicted of making false
statements to the Internal Revenue Service, from teaching students
under age eighteen during her probation.'" The court rejected the
trial judge's justification that allowing a perjurer to teach young people
would send a bad message to the public. 358 The court explained that
the sentencing court's objective should be the goals of probation, not
the message to the public. 159 Nevertheless, the court upheld the con-
dition because it would protect the impressionable children from the
defendant's possible propensity for dishonesty."' Thus, the court dis-
tinguished general deterrence from rehabilitation and protection of
the public."'
151 M at 954-55.
152
 M at 958.
1 " See id at 959.
irvi rd.
Abushaar, 761 F.2d at 959.
156 See 781 F.2d 29,35 (2d Cir. 1986).
157 Id. at 31.
158 See id. at 34-35.
1" See IS at 35.
18° See id
161 See Ulla, 781 F.2d at 35.
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III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF PRORATION CONDITIONS
A. The Standard of Review Generally
Sentencing judges have broad discretion in fashioning probation
conditions.' 62
 The basic standard of review for abuse of this discretion
is whether the conditions are "reasonably related" to the goals of
probation.' 63
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
applied this standard in the 1980 case of Higdon v. United States.' 64
 The
court of appeals held that probation conditions requiring the proba-
tioner to forfeit all assets and work three years of full-time charity
work were not reasonably related to rehabilitation or protection of the
public.'" Army Master Sergeant Higdon was convicted of defrauding
the government of several hundred thousand dollars while he oper-
ated servicemen's clubs in Vietnam.' 66
 The United States District Court
for the Central District of California imposed a five-year suspended
prison term and placed Higdon on probation.' 67 Special conditions of
probation required Higdon to forfeit all his assets, including his home,
and to work full time for charity for three years, without pay.' 68
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the conditions as not
reasonably related to rehabilitating the probationer or protecting the
public.' 6° The court established an analytical framework within which
to evaluate the reasonable relationship. 17° First, the court considered
whether the trial judge imposed the conditions for a permissible pur-
pose.' 71
 If the purpose were impermissible, the conditions would fail.' 72
Second, the court considered whether the impact of the conditions
was substantially greater than necessary to carry out the purposes.'" If
162 See United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir, 1981); State v. Moses, 618 A.2d 478,
480 (Vt. 1992).
163
 IS U.S.C. § 3563(b) (1988 & Supp. 1991) (judge may fashion conditions to the extent
that such conditions are reasonably related to" enumerated goals); 1..AFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note
18, at 943.
164 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980).
161 1d. at 896, 898.
166
 Id. at 896.
167 1d.
16B Id.
169 Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898.
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so, the conditions would fail.'" The court then applied this framework
to the case.'"
The Ninth Circuit stated that the permissible purposes of proba-
tion are rehabilitation and protection of the public.'" The court warned
that, although punishment may be an incidental effect of conditions
that serve the permissible goals, punishment may not be the primary
purpose of a condition.'" The court also explained that probation
conditions may not be used to circumvent statutory sentencing lim-
its.'" The court specified that a proper inquiry into the sentencing
judge's purpose includes an examination of the text of the conditions
and the transcript of the judge's remarks at the sentencing hearing.'"
The transcript of Higdon's sentencing hearing indicated that the judge
was outraged at Higdon's abuse of public trust during wartime, and
believed that the statutory maximum sentence was too lenient's° The
Ninth Circuit also stated that the severity of the conditions might
indicate an impermissible purpose.'s' The court, however, declined to
decide whether the judge's primary purpose was punishment's'
The Ninth Circuit then considered whether the conditions were
reasonably related to permissible purposes. 1 "S The court reiterated that
the conditions must not restrict the probationer's lawful activities sub-
stantially more than necessary. 184
 The court then carefully examined
the effect of the forfeiture of assets and the burdensome work sched-
ule.'" The court concluded that the staggering impact of the condi-
tions disrupted Higdon's family life and health, and led him to violate
probation, thus frustrating the rehabilitative goal's° Because the im-
pact of the conditions was substantially greater than necessary to ac-
174 Higdon, 627 F.2d at 897.
175 See id at 898. The court noted that yet another consideration, the extent to which the
conditions serve the legitimate needs of law entbrcement, might be relevant in some cases. Id
at 897 n.7. The court cited as an example a case where probation officers wished to conduct
occasional searches of a drug dealer to prevent recidivism. Id.
176 Id. at 897-98.
177 Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898 & n.8.
178
 Id. at 898.
178 See id. at 898 & n.9.
180 See id at 898 & n.11.
181
 Id, at 898.
182 Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898.
188 Id.
184 See id
185 See id at 899-900.
159 See id at 896.
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complish their goals, the court held that the condition was not reason-
ably related to the permissible goals.' 87
Thus, the most basic standard of review of probation conditions
asks whether they are reasonably related to the goals of probation.' 88
The purpose must be a permissible one, i.e., one of the goals of
probation.'89 The requirement of a reasonable relationship between
the condition and the goals means only that the conditions must not
be substantially more restrictive than necessary to accomplish the per-
missible purpose.'"
B. Probation Conditions That Restrict Probationers' Fundamental
Rights: The Standard of Appellate Review
The mere fact that a probation condition restricts a fundamental
right does not invalidate the condition.' 9 ' Nevertheless, courts subject
probation conditions that restrict fundamental rights to more careful
review than the mere "reasonable relationship" standard.' 92 Massachu-
setts requires that such conditions be necessary to the purposes of
rehabilitation and protection of the public.'" Other jurisdictions apply
various, less stringent standards of review to conditions that restrict
fundamental rights.'" Although Massachusetts has not yet ruled on
probation conditions that restrict probationers' freedom of expression,
other jurisdictions have applied their less stringent standards of review
to such conditions.' 98
1. Conditions That Restrict Probationers' Fundamental Rights:
Massachusetts Law
In 1988, in Commonwealth v. LaFrance, the Supreme judicial Court
of Massachusetts considered for the first time a probation condition
187 See Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898, 899-900.
188 See supra notes 162-87 and accompanying text.
189 See Higdon, 627 F.2d at 897.
190 See id. at 898.
181 United States v, Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991).
I 92 See United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990) (conditions that restrict
fundamental rights subject to careful review); United States v Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir.
1981) (judicial discretion carefully reviewed where conditions restrict fundamental rights); State
v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Minn. 1989) (judicial discretion carefully reviewed where
conditions restrict fundamental rights).
199 See infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text,
194 See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
195 See infra notes 235-70 and accompanying text.
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that restricted a probationer's fundamental rights.'" The court invali-
dated a probation condition authorizing warrantless searches by a
probation officer, because warrantless searches are not necessary to
accomplish the goals of probation. 197 Following LaFrance's plea of
guilty to burglary and larceny, the trial court sentenced LaFrance to a
suspended sentence with probation for two years.'" The trial court
ordered, as a special condition of probation, that the defendant submit
to searches, with or without a warrant, at the request of a probation
officer.'99
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts first held
that, under article fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
the probation condition could validly subject LaFrance to searches
based on reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause. 2" The
court reasoned that the reduced level of required suspicion was nee-
196 See 525 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Mass. 1988).
197 See id at 382-83.
199
 Id. at 380.
199 Id. at 380 n.2. The condition required the defendant to "[s]ubmit to any search of herself,
her properties or any place where she then resides or is situate, with or without a search warrant,
by a probation officer or by any law enforcement officer at the direction . . of the probation
officer." Id.
200 LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d at 381. The text of article fourteen provides that:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures,
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore,
are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant ... to . search
arrest	 or seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation
of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure„ .
MASS. CONST. part 1, art. XIV.
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court recently upheld a state regulation
that authorized warrantless searches by probation officers based on reasonable grounds. La-
France, 525 N.E.2d at 381 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)). The Fourth Amend-
ment generally requires government agents to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before
conducting a search or seizure. See L.AF Av E & ISRAEL, supra note 18, at 109. In Griffin, the United
States Supreme Court noted that the text of the Fourth Amendment mandates that judicial
warrants may issue only upon probable cause. 483 U.S. at 877; see U.S. CoNs-r. amend. IV ("no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause"). The holding of the Supreme judicial Court of
Massachusetts in LaFrance contradicts this aspect of Griffin. See LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d at 381-82;
see also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877-78. To comply with Griffin, the LaFrance court should have (1)
permitted warrantless searches upon reasonable suspicion, or (2) required search warrants based
upon probable cause. See LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d at 381-82; see also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877-78.
Although article fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not contain a probable
cause requirement for warrants, the Fourth Amendment has been incorporated through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply against the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
incorporated through Fourteenth Amendment, imposes exclusionary rule on states); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (Fourth Amendment right to privacy enforceable against
states through Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
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essary to aid LaFrance's rehabilitation, to ensure her compliance with
the probation conditions, and to protect the public."' The court next
held that the probation condition could not validly subject LaFrance
to warrantless searches under article fourteen. 202
 The court observed
that eliminating the warrantless search condition would not impede
the goals of probation: rehabilitation and protecting the public. 203
Therefore, the court held, warrantless searches were not necessary to
accomplish the goals of probation. 204
 The court thus held that, where
probation conditions restrict a probationer's fundamental rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the restriction must be necessary
to serve the goals of probation: rehabilitation and protecting the pub-
2. Conditions That Restrict Probationers' Fundamental Rights:
Jurisdictions Other Than Massachusetts
Jurisdictions other than Massachusetts also apply heightened scru-
tiny to probation conditions that restrict fundamental rights. 206 Those
jurisdictions, however, apply this heightened scrutiny less stringently
than Massachusetts' "necessary to accomplish the purposes of proba-
tion" test. 207
 In one formulation of this heightened scrutiny test, courts
balance three factors: (1) the goals of probation; (2) the extent to
which the constitutional rights enjoyed by law abiding citizens should
be afforded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law en-
forcement. 206
 In another formulation, the condition must be (1) care-
One may try to reconcile Griffin and LaFrance by holding that probation officer searches
are administrative searches, for which warrants may issue upon less than probable cause. See
Griffin,  483 U.S. at 877 n.4; LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d at 381-82; see also .1.,A17 AvE & ISRAEL, SUP/ note
18, at 944-45. However, the Court's opinion in Griffin indicates that probation officer searches
are not administrative searches. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877-78. Thus, it seems that the Griffin
Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require a state to provide less protection of
privacy rights than its own state constitution would otherwise provide. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at
877-78; LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d at 381-82.
2° 1 See LaFranee, 525 N.E.2d at 381. The court warned, however, that no level of suspicion
below reasonable suspicion would meet the requirements of article 14. Id. at 381-82.
2°2 id. at 382.
2°3
 Id. at 383 ("[u) pholding the warrant requirements for searches of the probationer's home
does not impede the dual goals of probation, protecting the public and rehabilitation") (quoting
State v. Griffin, 388 N.W.2d 535,545 (Wis. 1986) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting), alp, 483 U.S. at
868 (1987)).
204
 See id. at 382-83.
"5 Sep LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d at 381-83.
Zoe See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
207 See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
208 See United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562,567 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Tonry, 605
F.2d 144,150 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Haynes, 423 N.W.2d 102,103-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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fully drawn to serve the goals of probation, and (2) logically related to
the criminal conduct in which the probationer engaged. 2°9 Finally,
some courts merely state that probation conditions restricting a pro-
bationer's freedom must be "especially fine-tuned. "210
3. Conditions That Restrict Probationers' Freedom of Expression as
Protected by the First Amendment
Determining whether Power's probation condition restricts a fun-
damental right requires a brief examination of the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of expression?" No Massachusetts law governs
probation conditions restricting freedom of expression. 212 Other juris-
dictions, however, have upheld such conditions to the extent that they
relate to preventing the probationer from repeating his or her crime. 2 ' 3
Two federal courts have upheld conditions prohibiting probationers
from selling their crime stories. 214
a. The First Amendment: Freedom of Expression
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents
the government from abridging the freedom of expression. 215 Freedom
of expression encourages social discourse on important and controver-
sial issues. 216 The First Amendment's essence prevents the government
from prohibiting the expression of an idea merely because society finds
it distasteful. 217 If the government regulates speech based on its con-
tent, i.e., the message itself or the effect of the message on its audience,
the government must generally show that the regulation is narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling state interest. 218
2119 See United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991).
210 United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 1992).
211 See infra notes 215-34 and accompanying text.
212 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at 32.
215 See infra notes 235-70 and accompanying text.
214 See infra notes 271-82 and accompanying text.
215 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The text of the First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
216 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
217 Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Gt. 501, 509 (1991).
218
 LAURENCE H, TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL. LAw 833 (2d ed. 1988). The govern-
ment may alternatively show that the speech falls within an unprotected category such as fighting
words, obscenity or defamation. See id at 849; 861.
September 1994]	 KATHERINE ANN POWER	 1225
The government need not completely prohibit speech to restrict
the freedom of expression. 219 Imposing a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech is presumptively inconsistent
with the First Amendment. 22° In 1991, in Simon & Schuster v. New York
Crime Victims Board, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a law
that restricted the ability of criminals to profit from telling their crime
stories."' New York's "Son of Sam" law placed the compensation for
such crime stories in an escrow account for five years, to satisfy claims
against a criminal by his or her victims, the victims' families, the
criminal's creditors, and state and local tax authorities. 222 The Court
observed that the statute imposed a financial burden on speech based
on its content. 223 According to the Court, therefore, to survive consti-
tutional scrutiny, the statute must be necessary to a compelling state
interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 224
The Court recognized compensation of crime victims from the
proceeds of the crime as a compelling state interest. 223 The Court,
however, held that the New York legislature did not narrowly tailor the
statute to serve that purpose. 226 The statute applied to any work that
expressed the criminal's thoughts about the crime, however inciden-
tally or tangentially. 227 Moreover, the statute applied to any author who
admitted commission of a crime, regardless of whether the person was
ever accused or convicted.228 The Court also observed that the crimi-
nal's creditors would have claims against the proceeds, in addition to
the victims and their families. 229
 The Court concluded that the "Son of
Sam" law was overinclusive because the law reached many works that
neither enabled criminals to profit from their crimes nor left victims
uncompensated."° The Court, therefore, invalidated New York's Son
219 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
22° See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447.
221 112 S. CL at 512.
222 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 632-a (repealed by 1992 N.Y. Laws c. 618, § 10, effective July 24, 1992)
(West 1982 Sc Supp. 1994). The statute defined a convicted criminal as one who pled guilty to a
crime, was convicted of a crime after trial, or admitted to the commission of a crime. Id.
See Simon Ee Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509.
224
 Id, at 509.
225 Id. at 511. The Court expressly left open the question of whether book royalties can
properly be termed proceeds of a crime. Id. at 510. The Court noted that singling out income
from "storytelling" was unrelated to the state's interest in transferring all crime proceeds from
criminals to victims. Id, at 510.
220 Simon &' Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512.
227 1d. at 511.
2281d,
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of Sam law because it was not narrowly tailored to compensate crime
victims from the crime proceeds."'
Simon & Schuster establishes that the government need not actu-
ally prohibit speech to implicate First Amendment rights. 232
 Restricting
the ability to profit from certain speech based on the content of that
speech restricts First Amendment rights and is presumptively uncon-
stitutional. 233
 Therefore, a probation condition that prohibits a proba-
tioner from profiting by selling his or her crime story restricts the
probationer's fundamental right to freedom of expression."'
b. Probation Conditions That Restrict Probationers' Freedom of
Expression: Jurisdictions Other Than Massachusetts
The Power probation restriction on freedom of expression pre-
sents an issue of first impression under Massachusetts law. 235 Other
jurisdictions, however, have ruled on such conditions.236
 These jurisdic-
tions generally uphold conditions that restrict probationers' freedom
of expression, to the extent that the conditions are related to prevent-
ing the probationer from repeating his or her crime.'" For example,
in 1981, in United States v. Lowe, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld probation conditions that restricted the
probationers' ability to distribute leaflets and assemble near a nuclear
submarine base."' The court reasoned that the conditions were closely
related to the probationers' crime: trespassing on the base during a
demonstration. 239
The probationers in Lowe trespassed on the Naval Submarine Base
in Bangor, Washington to protest the government's maintenance of
the Trident weapons system. 24° During one of a series of demonstra-
tions at the base, the probationers scaled a boundary fence and en-
tered Navy property. "'Following conviction for this unlawful entry, the
231
 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ci at 512.




 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at 32.
236 See infra notes 235-70 and accompanying text.
237 See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144,146,150-51 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding probation
condition prohibiting former Congressman from participating in politics, where former Con-
gressman violated election laws).
225 See United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567-568 (9th Cir, 1981).
239 See id. at 564,567-68.
24" Id. at 564.
241 Id.
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trial court ordered suspended sentences and imposed a probation
condition that the probationers not come within 250 feet of the base."'"
This condition effectively prevented the probationers from distributing
leaflets on the public road adjacent to the boundary fence.'" The
condition also prevented them from attending weekly anti-Trident
meetings on private property adjacent to the base.""
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the conditions against the
probationers' freedom of speech and freedom of association chal-
lenges."" The court recognized that probation conditions restricting
fundamental rights merit careful review."'" The court stated that such
conditions, to be valid, must be designed primarily to rehabilitate the
probationer and protect the public.'" The court considered the follow-
ing factors in evaluating the condition: (1) the purposes of probation;
(2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding
citizens should be afforded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate
needs of law enforcement.'"
Applying these factors to the facts, the court first noted that the
condition protected the public from repeat offenses by the probation-
ers.'" Because their offense required them to climb the barrier fence,
the court reasoned that the 250-foot restriction discouraged the pro-
bationers from repeating their crime and protected the public from
further critnes. 250
 Second, the court noted that the condition imposed
a minimal restriction on freedom of expression and association. 25 ' The
court reasoned that the condition only restricted the First Amendment
activities that required close proximity to the barrier fence. 2 `i2 Outside
the 250-foot zone, the probationers enjoyed the same First Amend-
ment rights as law-abiding citizens. 2 ' Finally, the court noted that the
250-foot zone served as a buffer, enabling law enforcement officials to
detect probation violations.'" The court thus upheld probation condi-
242 Id.
243 Lowe, 654 F.2d at 564.
244 ht.
243 Id. at 567-68.
246 Id. at 567 .
247 Id.
248 Lowe, 654 F.2d at 567.
243




233 See Lowe, 654 F.2d at 567-68.
254 Id. at 568.
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tions restricting freedom of speech and association because the condi-
tions were closely related to the probationers' crime. 255
When, however, conditions that restrict freedom of expression
extend beyond preventing recidivism, courts narrow the conditions or
eliminate them completely.256 For example, in 1971, in In re Mannino,
a California appeals court invalidated probation conditions prohibit-
ing the defendant from speaking or writing in protest, and prohibiting
membership in protest organizations."' The court upheld, however, a
condition forbidding active participation in a demonstration. 258 In Man-
nino, a California trial court convicted the defendant for an assault
stemming from his active participation in a demonstration. 259 In over-
turning the probation conditions prohibiting protest speech or writing
and membership in protest organizations, the appellate court rea-
soned that writing and membership in protest organizations were
unrelated to a recurrence of the crime.266
 The court recognized that
speaking might lead to another confrontation under certain circum-
stances, but the prohibition of all forms of protest speech was over-
broad. 26' Finally, the court reasoned that active demonstration had led
to the crime and would likely do so again, thus the prohibition against
active participation in demonstrations was valid. 262
 Thus, the court
invalidated probation conditions that restricted freedom of expression
insofar as they were unrelated to preventing recidivism by the proba-
tioner. 263
Similarly, in 1971, in Porth v. Templar, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit struck down probation conditions that
prohibited the probationer from speaking or writing activities that
questioned the constitutionality of the federal tax laws.264 The trial
court convicted the probationer of failure to file his tax returns. 265 The
probationer was involved in a campaign to urge people to disregard
the federal income tax laws. 266 The appellate court reasoned that al-
255
	 IS at 567-68.
256 See Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330,334 (10th Cir. 1971); In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880,
886-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
257 92 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87.
256 Id. at 887.
25'9 at 881.
266 See id. at 886.
261 See id. at 886-87.
262 Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
265 See id. at 886-87.
264 453 F.2d 330,334 (10th Cir. 1971).
265m at 332.
266 IS at 334.
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lowing the defendant to express his opinion on the tax laws was not
harmful. 267 Accordingly, the condition was invalid. 268 The court stated,
however, that the condition could validly prohibit the defendant from
encouraging others to violate the tax laws:288 Thus, the court invali-
dated probation conditions that restricted freedom of expression inso-
far as they were unrelated to preventing a recurrence of the proba-
tioner's crime. 272
c. Cases Upholding Conditions Similar to Power's Probation Conditions
Two courts have upheld probation conditions that prohibit crimi-
nals from profiting by selling their stories.271 In 1988, in United States
v. Terrigno, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld a probation condition prohibiting Terrigno from profiting by
selling her crime story. 272 The trial court convicted Terrigno of embez-
zlement of public funds that were intended for the poor and home-
less. 273 Reviewing the limitation on Terrigno's ability to sell her story,
the court of appeals determined that the condition did not restrict
Terrigno's freedom of speech, merely her ability to profit thereby. 274
The court reasoned that the profit restriction would send a message
to Terrigno that "crime doesn't pay," aiding her rehabilitation. 27' The
court of appeals thus held that the restriction on profit by selling a
crime story was reasonably related to Terrigno's rehabilitation. 276
In 1986, in United States v. Waxman, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld, on Waxman's
21;7 id.
2" Id.
269 Porth, 453 F.2d at 334. Although the court's reasoning might suggest that general deter-
rence drives its decision, advocacy of illegal conduct is a type of speech which has not traditionally
enjoyed stringent First Amendment protection. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (per curiam) (government may proscribe advocacy of illegal conduct where advocacy is
(1) directly related to producing imminent lawless action, and (2) likely to incite or produce such
action). Moreover, the probationer's crime in Porth was part of a larger scheme to urge people
to violate the federal income tax laws. See 453 F.2d at 334. The condition, as the court of appeals
narrowed it, thus served to prevent the probationer from continuing down a path of illegal
conduct. See id,
27° Id. at 334.
271 United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Waxman, 638
F. Supp. 1245, 1246 (El). Pa. 1986). For an argument distinguishing these cases from Power v.
Commonwealth, see infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text.
272 See 838 F.2d at 374.
275 1d. at 373.
274 1d. at 374.
275 Id.
276
1230	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 35:1203
motion for reconsideration, its own probation condition that Waxman
not profit by selling his crime story.'" Waxman pled guilty to receiving
stolen property in connection with numerous art thefts."' The court
stated that it did not impose the restriction on profit to punish Waxman. 79
The court imposed the condition to send the message to Waxman, and
to society, that "crime doesn't pay." 28° The court stated that the condi-
tion did not restrict Waxman's freedom of speech, merely his ability
to profit thereby."' Thus, the court held that the condition prohibiting
profit was reasonably related to the purposes of probation. 282
IV. KATHERINE ANN POWER'S PROBATION CONDITION
The United States Supreme Court has held that governmental
imposition of a financial burden on speech based on its content is
presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment."' Katherine Ann
Power's probation condition prohibits her from profiting by selling her
"story. "2" The condition imposes a serious financial burden on speech
of a specified content: anything related to her crime or her life as a
fugitive."' Therefore, the condition restricts her freedom of expression
under the First Amendment. 28° This restriction of a fundamental right
triggers a more careful level of review than the mere reasonable rela-
tionship standard."'
277 See Waxman, 638 F. Supp. at 1246.
278 /ct. at 1245.
279 Id. at 1246.
280 Id,
281 Id.
282 See Waxman, 638 F. Sup p. at 1246. Because the court intended to send a message to society,
as well as to Waxman, the trial court apparently considered general deterrence to be a permissible
purpose of probation. See id.
283 See Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991).
284 Appendix, supra note 1, at 88-89, 117.
285 la
286 See Simon C.9.7 Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509.
287 See supra notes 191-210 and accompanying text. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts could strike down this condition under several additional theories. The court could hold
that the First Amendment establishes a base level of protection that every state must provide,
regardless of each state's test for probation conditions that restrict fundamental rights. Such a
holding would, of course, be subject to review by the United States Supreme Court. Similarly, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts could hold that article sixteen of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights establishes a base level of protection upon which probation conditions may
not infringe. See MASS. CoNsr. part 1, art. XVI ("The right of free speech shall not be abridged.");
see also Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Mass. 1988) (holding that warrantless
searches by probation officer violate article fourteen of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights).
Such a holding would not be open to federal review. When reviewing probation conditions
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A. The Power Probation Condition Is Not Necessary to a Permissible
Purpose Under Massachusetts Probation Law
The test for Massachusetts probation conditions that restrict fun-
damental rights asks whether the conditions are necessary to serve the
goals of probation. 288
 The dual goals that Massachusetts probation
conditions must serve are rehabilitation of the probationer and pro-
tection of the public against the probationer's recidivism. 289
 General
deterrence, aimed at the public at large, is not a permissible goal of
Massachusetts probation. 2" One can test whether a condition is neces-
sary to the goals of probation by asking whether eliminating the con-
dition would impede the goals of probation, as the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts did in Commonwealth v. LaFrance. 291 Would
eliminating the condition impede efforts to rehabilitate Katherine Ann
Power and to protect the public from her recidivism?
I. The Probation Condition Is Not Necessary for Rehabilitation or
Protecting the Public Against Recidivism
The probation condition is not necessary to Power's rehabilitation
because she has already taken steps to rehabilitate herself. Power turned
herself in to suffer the consequences of her actions. 292 She does not
deny responsibility for the death of Officer Schroeder. 2" Power regrets
the pain that she caused the Schroeder family. 2" Power's ability to
admit responsibility for her crime is an essential step toward rehabili-
tation. 295
restricting freedom of expression, however, state and federal courts have merely asked whether
the restriction is acceptable in light of the goals of probation, rather than find a base level of
constitutional protection for probationers. See supra notes 235-70 and accompanying text.
Finally, the court could avoid the , constitutional issue by declaring that concurrent sentences
of probation and imprisonment violate the Massachusetts probation statute. See supra notes
118-23 and accompanying text. Avoiding constitutional issues where other grounds for decision
are available is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854
(1985) (prior to reaching. constitutional questions, federal courts must consider non-constitu-
tional grounds for decision); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Comm' r, 571 N.E.2d 617, 619 (Mass. 1991)
(addressing question of statutory interpretation first "so as to avoid the constitutional question if
it is fairly possible to decide the case on other grounds"); Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 374 N.E.2d
1203, 1206 (Mass. 1978) (court will ordinarily "not pass upon a constitutional question . . if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed or).
2a8
 See Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 381-83 (Mass, 1988).
289 See supra notes 129-61 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 139-61 and accompanying text,
291 See 525 N.E.2d at 382-83.
292
 See Appendix, supra note 1, at 83.
293 See a
294 See id.
295 See United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding probation
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Ironically, the probation condition actually impedes Power's reha-
bilitation. She also pled guilty to robbing a federal armory, and the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced
her to a prison term concurrent with her state term. 296 The district
court encouraged Power to sell her story and share the proceeds with
the Schroeder family.297 The court suggested this as a way for Power to
demonstrate her remorse.'" Power can take no such action because of
the state probation condition."' A probation condition is necessary to
a permissible purpose if eliminating the condition would impede that
purpose."' Permitting Power to sell her story and share the proceeds
with the Schroeders would certainly not impede her rehabilitation.
Thus, the probation condition is not necessary to her rehabilitation.
Restricting Power's ability to profit from selling her story bears no
relationship to her recidivism. She lived a quiet life during her years
in hiding, and harmed no one."' The only person she considered
harming was herself, until her therapist began treating her."' Finally,
what possible danger will Power pose to society from within the walls
of her jail cell? Preventing Power from selling her story bears no logical
relationship to preventing her recidivism, and is clearly not necessary
to accomplish that purpose.
2. The Power Condition Is Not Necessary to Accomplish General
Deterrence
Assuming, arguendo, that general deterrence is a permissible pur-
pose of Massachusetts probation, prohibiting Power from selling her
story is not necessary to accomplish general deterrence. Allowing
Power to sell her story will have a negligible effect, if any, on the
behavior of the general public in Massachusetts, which is the focus of
general deterrence."' The argument that the no-profit condition pro-
motes general deterrence rests upon the following logic. There must
be a number of people who will decide to commit crimes if Power is
allowed to sell her story. These criminals must then plan crimes with
the goal of getting caught, and with the further goal of generating
condition that police officers, convicted of perjury, make public apology, because offender's
recognition of fault is first step toward rehabilitation).
298 Daly, supra note 13, at A3.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 See Brief far Appellant, supra note 13, at Ex. 13.
3c° See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
301 See Carlson, supra note 11, at 61.
3°2 See id.
503 See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text
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enough publicity to reap substantial book or movie royalties. Finally,
the criminals must hope to.receive short enough prison sentences to
one day enjoy their royalties. Surely the restriction on Power's freedom
of expression cannot be necessary to prevent publicity-driven criminals
from following such an absurd plan.
B. Even Under the Less Stringent Tests of Other Jurisdictions, the Power
Condition Would Fail
1. The Power Condition Does Not Meet the "Heightened Scrutiny"
Test
Other jurisdictions have upheld conditions that restrict probation-
ers' freedom of expression to the extent that they prevent the proba-
tioners from repeating their crimes."' In 1971, in In re Mannino, a
California appeals court struck down probation conditions that re-
stricted the probationer's freedom of expression." Mannino commit-
ted an assault in connection with his role in an anti-war demonstra-
tion." The court reasoned that the conditions prohibiting him from
writing or speaking in protest of the war bore no relation to preventing
his recidivism."7 The court, however, upheld the condition prohibiting
Mannino from active participation in demonstrations." The court
reasoned that this condition kept Mannino out of the circumstances
that led to his crime and would likely lead to a repeat offense.'" Thus,
the court upheld conditions restricting Mannino's freedom of expres-
sion only insofar as they prevented him from repeating his crime.'"
The condition that prevents Katherine Ann Power from selling
her story bears absolutely no relationship to preventing her recidivism.
Power's crime was committed as part of a bank robbery. She cannot
possibly commit another bank robbery while serving an eight to twelve
year prison sentence. Even if she were not in prison, there is no reason
to believe she is likely to commit another bank robbery. During her
time in hiding she has shown no propensity for robbing banks. 91 ' She
understands that her crime was inexcusable and irresponsible. 312
304 See supra notes 235-70 and accompanying text.
"5 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
m6 1(1. at 887.
507 1d. at 886-87.
303 Id. at 887.
109 1d.
31° See Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87.
311 See Carbon, supra note 11, at 61.
312 See Appendix, supra note 1, at 83.
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Furthermore, in the cases upholding probation conditions that
restrict freedom of expression, the conditions kept the probationers
out of the circumstances that led to their crimes. 313
 This is not true of
the condition in Power v. Commonwealth. The circumstances leading to
Power's crime included her involvement in radical student groups in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, and more specifically the plan to arm
the Black Panthers. 314
 Prohibiting Power from selling her story bears
absolutely no relationship to insulating Power from those circum-
stances. Indeed, similar circumstances will likely never recur.
2. The Power Condition Does Not Meet the Mere "Reasonable
Relationship" Test
Two federal courts have held that conditions similar to Power's
are reasonably related to rehabifitation. 316
 Although this is not the
proper test of the Power condition under Massachusetts law, the Power
condition is not even reasonably related to rehabilitation. In Terrigno
and Waxman, the probationers received no prison time. 316 The courts,
therefore, felt the need to send a message to the probationers by
prohibiting profit. 317
 The courts reasoned that sending such a message
was reasonably related to rehabilitating the probationers. 318 In contrast,
Katherine Ann Power is currently serving an eight to twelve year term
of imprisonment. Years of incarceration will drive home a far stronger
message than preventing Power from selling her story.
Terrigno and Waxman are distinguishable from the Power case for
several reasons."9
 First, both Terrigno and Waxman preceded Simon &
Schuster v. New York. Crime Victims Board. 32° In 1988; Simon & Schuster
established that to impose a financial disincentive upon certain speech
based on its content was to restrict freedom of expression."' The
Terrigno and Waxman courts, however, expressly stated that the proba-
tion conditions prohibiting profit by selling crime stories did not re-
strict free speech. 322 Because the Terrigno and Waxman courts found
313 See supra notes 235-70 and accompanying text.
314 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 28.
313
 United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371,375 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Waxman, 638
F. Supp. 1245,1246 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
313 Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 375; Waxman, 638 F. Supp. at 1245-46.
317 Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374; Waxman, 638 F. Supp. at 1246.
318 Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374; Waxman, 638 F. Supp. at 1246.
319 See Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374; Waxman, 638 F. Supp. at 1246.
32° See Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 371; Waxman, 638 F. Supp, at 1245.
321 See Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. CL 501,509 (1991).
322 Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374; Waxman, 638 F. Supp. at 1246.
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no restriction of the fundamental right to free speech, the courts
upheld the conditions under the mere reasonable relationship test."'
Second, by imposing concurrent terms of prison and probation,
the trial court contorted the probation statute to impose more punish-
ment than available through conventional sentencing options. In Hig-
don v. United States, the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated that sentencing judges may not use probation conditions
to circumvent conventional sentencing limits. 324 To ascertain the trial
court's motivation, the Higdon court examined the text of the proba-
tion order and the trial court's statements at sentencing. 325 Examining
the Power condition in this manner reveals that the trial court sought
to effect more punishment on Power than available through the sen-
tence that the District Attorney recommended.
At Power's sentencing, the trial court stated that he was departing
from the plea agreement by adding a twenty-year term of probation. 326
To explain the departure, the court said, "I will not permit profit from
the life blood of a Boston police officer by someone responsible for
his killing. That is repugnant to me. I could not live with myself if I
permitted it."3" The trial court, therefore, understood that a prison
term could not prevent Power from profiting. The only way for the
court to prevent her from profiting was with the special condition of
probation. As the Ninth Circuit observed in Higdon, probation condi-
tions may not be the vehicle for circumvention of the limits of a prison
sentence. 328
Finally, by sending a message that "crime doesn't pay," the Terrigno
and Waxman courts miss the critical issue. When a criminal sells his or
her story to the media, it is publicity that pays, not crime. Courts should
not decide that there are certain types of publicity from which people
may not benefit. For better or for worse, the "marketplace of ideas"
reflects the value that our free society places on speech. 429 The price
of freedom is that people must permit speech that they dislike 33°
Although the thought of Power profiting by selling the story of her
crime may be repugnant, the essence of the First Amendment is that
government may not suppress. speech merely because society finds it
323 Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374; Waxman, 638 F. Stipp. at 1246.
324 627 F.2d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1980).
825 Id.
326 See Appendix, supra note 1, at 88.
327 1d. at 89.
328 627 F2d at 898.
329 See Cf./Amiens Brief supra note 90, at 9.
330 See id.
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offensive. 33 ' Indeed, it is unpopular speech that the First Amendment
must protect. 332 Private individuals may censor offensive speech on
their own by ignoring it. In the "marketplace of ideas," this may be the
most effective disincentive of all.
V. CONCLUSION
In a free market, freedom of expression enables people to profit
from both fame and infamy. Offended by Katherine Anne Power's
potential to profit from her notoriety, the trial court imposed a proba-
tion condition that restricted Katherine Ann Power's freedom of ex-
pression. The condition is not necessary to either of the permissible
purposes of probation in Massachusetts: rehabilitation of the proba-
tioner, and protecting the public from the probationer's recidivism.
Therefore, the condition must fail as an unconstitutional restriction
on Power's freedom of expression.
SHAUN B. SPENCER
"I See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ("(Tlhe fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient
reason for suppressing it.... For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.").
"2 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414, Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 745-46.
